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NOTES
The Near Impossibility of Pleading Falsity of Opinion
Statements Under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act and Rule 10b-5
I. Introduction
Imagine you have just invested in a company with expectations of
making a sizeable return on your investment. News breaks, and the market
responds positively to an acquisition. Because of the nature of the
acquisition and positive future outlook of the assets acquired, a large
portion of the purchase price is allocated to the goodwill account. This is
even better than expected, the price of your shares of stock continue to rise
during a period with a positive outlook and a high valuation of goodwill of
the newly acquired assets of the subsidiary. Then, with little forewarning,
the large goodwill account is suddenly depleted over a matter of a few
quarters, and all the appreciation of the stock is wiped away.
Now there is concern regarding overvalued goodwill because there may
have been inappropriate actions during this period that led to the improper
valuation. You wish to bring a lawsuit against the company and
management to recover losses resulting from potentially fraudulent actions.
Because goodwill is considered an opinion statement, the pleading standard
to allege fraud quickly becomes a minefield that is nearly impossible to
traverse in order to get past the pleading stage, even if there is illegal
conduct. At the pleading stage, the defendant has a toolbox full of defenses
that make getting past the pleading stage to discovery a burdensome task.
The recent Ninth Circuit decision in City of Dearborn Heights Act 345
Police & Fire Retirement System v. Align Technology, Inc. adds yet another
tool to the defendant’s toolbox that makes getting beyond the pleading
stage in such a case unlikely, which may ultimately allow illegal conduct to
continue without penalty.
II. Overview and Background
The origins of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Exchange Act of 1934
can be traced back to concerns arising from the Panic of 1907.1 The Panic
of 1907 began when a group of banks failed to obtain control of a mining
company, leading to significant losses on the New York Stock Exchange, a
1. Steve Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act, 42 STAN. L. REV. 385, 395-397 (1990).
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decline in investor confidence, and a call for government intervention.2
Congress formed committees in 1912 to investigate whether key industries
had become so concentrated that a few people controlled the entire
economy through their holdings on the New York Stock Exchange.3 The
committees concluded that the exchange operated to the benefit of a few of
its members and to the detriment of its investors.4 The committees likened
the state of the New York Stock Exchange to manipulation-prone gambling;
this was a grave concern.5 The efforts of the committees proved fruitless,
however, as Congress took no legislative action in response.6 The Panic of
1907 faded from memory and twenty years of prosperity on the New York
Stock Exchange discouraged further calls for regulation.7
But the stock market crash of 1929 and the Great Depression brought
securities regulation back to the forefront of public discussion.8 Congress
first enacted the Securities Act of 1933 to achieve truth in securities relating
to public offerings; it was designed to prevent the issuers from
manipulating the offerees in a public offering.9 Shortly thereafter, Congress
enacted the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to regulate brokers, dealers,
the securities market, and the securities traded in certain markets.10 The
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 created a periodic disclosure system for
securities traded on the market.11 The purpose of enacting legislation to
regulate exchange operation was “for the protection of investors, [] the
safeguarding of values, and . . . the elimination of unnecessary, unwise, and
destructive speculation.”12 The purpose of the Securities Act of 1933 and
the Exchange Act of 1934, coupled with the context in which they were
passed, demonstrate that the “fundamental purpose, common to these
statutes, was to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy

2. Id. at 395.
3. Id. at 402-03.
4. Id. at 403.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 406.
7. Id. at 407-08.
8. Id. at 408.
9. Milton H. Cohen, “Truth in Securities” Revisited, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1340, 1340,
1367-68 (1966).
10. Id. at 1340-41.
11. Shurkin v. Golden State Vintners, Inc., 303 F. App’x 431, 433 (9th Cir. 2008).
12. Thel, supra note 1, at 425 (quoting President's Message to Congress, 3 PUB. PAPERS
90, 91 (Feb. 9, 1934), reprinted in 78 CONG. REC. 2264 (1934)).
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of caveat emptor and thus to achieve a high standard of business ethics in
the securities industry.”13
This is the context in which section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
operates to protect investors. Section 10(b) provides:
It shall be unlawful . . . [t]o use or employ, in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security . . . any manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules
and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary
or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors.”14
Congress enacted section 10(b) to authorize the Securities Exchange
Commission (SEC) to issue rules and regulations “prohibit[ing] or
regulat[ing] the use of any other manipulative or deceptive practices which
it finds detrimental to the interests of the investor.”15 Pursuant to this
power, and to clarify what it considers to be “manipulative or deceptive
practices,” the SEC devised rule 10b-5 which provides that:
It shall be unlawful . . . (a) [t]o employ any device, scheme, or
artifice to defraud, (b) [t]o make any untrue statement of a
material fact or to omit . . . a material fact necessary in order to
make the statements . . . not misleading, (c) [t]o engage in any
act . . . which operates . . . as a fraud or deceit upon any
person . . . .16
A. Elements of a Section 10(b) Claim
The Supreme Court’s interpretation of section 10(b) allows for private
actions even though the text of the statute does not do so explicitly.17 The
Court has inferred this right to bring private actions in order to enforce the
purpose of the statute and to effectuate the overall intent of the provision. 18
13. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963); see also
Silver v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 366 (1963) (“The benefits which a guarantee of
procedural safeguards brings about are, moreover, of particular importance here. It requires
but little appreciation of the extent of the Exchange’s economic power and of what happened
in this country during the 1920’s and 1930’s to realize how essential it is that the highest
ethical standards prevail as to every aspect of the Exchange’s activities.”) (emphasis added).
14. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012) (emphasis added).
15. SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439, 450 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting S. REP. NO. 73-792, at 18
(1934)).
16. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2018).
17. Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2407 (2014).
18. See id.
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The elements of a section 10(b) claim require the plaintiff to prove “(1) a
material misrepresentation or omission by the defendant19; (2) scienter; (3)
a connection between the misrepresentation or omission; (4) reliance upon
the misrepresentation or omission; (5) economic loss; and (6) loss
causation.”20
B. Pleading Standards Generally
In claiming securities fraud, plaintiffs bringing a private action face
heightened pleading requirements that present large hurdles when alleging a
violation of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5.21 Claims of fraud under section
10(b) and rule 10b-5 must satisfy dual pleading requirements under both the
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b)22 and the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995.23 Under the FRCP 9(b), the complaint must “state
with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.” 24
Therefore, a plaintiff alleging fraud in violation of section 10(b) must plead
the particular circumstances of the fraud instead of only the typical pleading
requirements under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2).25
In addition to the increased pleading standards imposed by FRCP 9(b),
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLSRA) mandates
that “the complaint shall specify each statement alleged to have been
misleading” and “the reason or reasons why the statement is misleading.”26
Additionally, the PLSRA requires the complaint to “state with particularity
facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the
required [scienter].”27 The scienter requirement poses a particularly high
bar because “to adequately plead scienter, the complaint must now ‘state
with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant
acted with the required state of mind.’”28 To plead a “strong inference” of
scienter, the inference “must be cogent and at least as compelling as any

19. While this Note will discuss other factors, this is the main element of a 10(b) claim
that will be discussed.
20. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 157 (2008).
21. In re Verifone Holdings, Inc. Sec. Litig., 704 F.3d 694, 701 (9th Cir. 2012).
22. See FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).
23. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2012).
24. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).
25. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
26. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1)(B); see also Verifone Holdings, 704 F.3d at 701.
27. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2)(A).
28. Zucco Partners, LLC v. Digimarc Corp., 552 F.3d 981, 991 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting
15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2)(A)).
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opposing inference of nonfraudulent intent.”29 Pleading scienter presents a
significant hurdle for a securities fraud plaintiff, but that topic is not the
focus of this Note.30
This Note examines section 10(b) and rule 10b-5’s requirements that a
plaintiff plead the falsity component, which requires the plaintiff to
“specify each statement alleged to have been misleading, the reason or
reasons why the statement is misleading, and, if an allegation regarding the
statement or omission is made on information and belief . . . state with
particularity all facts on which that belief is formed.”31
It is worth noting the rationale and legal setting in which the PSLRA
requirements were passed and implemented. Congress was dissatisfied with
the manner in which courts of appeals were applying FRCP rule 9(b) in
their application of stating fraud with “particularity.”32 Congress recognized
and considered the serious nature of being named a party to a suit for fraud,
and the fact that, if the fraud claims prove unwarranted, serious damage to
reputation will have nevertheless been done.33 Congress was concerned
with the abuse it perceived in class actions filings in private securities
litigation alleging fraud.34 Congress believed parties were filing frivolous
suits, driven by lawyers, to target deep-pocket defendants with little merit
for the claim in order to then make extreme discovery requests.35 The
concern was that such practices were leading to extortionate type
settlements, which harmed companies and deterred involvement in
management positions of companies.36
With these issues in mind, Congress passed the PSLRA with the
“intent[ion] to strengthen existing pleading requirements”37 and balance the
two goals of the PSLRA “to curb frivolous, lawyer-driven litigation, while
preserving investors’ ability to recover on meritorious claims.”38 Thus,
although the PSLRA increases plaintiffs’ pleading requirements under
section 10(b) and rule 10b-5, the requirements have a justification—the
29. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 314 (2007).
30. See generally Michael D. Moritz, The Advent of Scienterless Fraud? Applying
Omnicare to Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 Claims, 13 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 595 (2017).
31. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1)(B).
32. H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 41 (1995) (Conf. Rep.).
33. Id.
34. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 81 (2006).
35. See id.; H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 28.
36. Merrill Lynch, 547 U.S. at 81; H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 28.
37. H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 41; see also Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.,
551 U.S. 308, 321-22 (2007).
38. Tellabs, Inc., 551 U.S. at 322.
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regulations were passed in response to abuse and unintended consequences
of having relaxed rules for pleading securities fraud. The remaining concern
is the balance between avoiding non-meritorious, harmful allegations while
allowing merited claims to proceed. The recent decision in City of
Dearborn Heights shifts the balance further in favor of preventing fraud
allegations from proceeding beyond the pleading stage.
III. Law Prior to City of Dearborn Heights: Pleading the First Prong
of a Section 10(b) Claim Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
A. Falsity and Materiality Under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934
Prior to City of Dearborn Heights Act 345 Police & Fire Retirement
System v. Align Technology, Inc., in order to satisfy the first prong of
pleading fraud there first had to be a material misstatement.39 For a
statement to be material, there had to be “a substantial likelihood that the
disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable
investor as having significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information made
available.”40 Further, the allegations had to “raise a reasonable expectation
that discovery will reveal evidence satisfying the materiality requirement,
and to allow the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable.”41
In addition to being material, the statement alleged to be misleading had
to be a factual misstatement to be actionable under section 10(b). 42
Statements of reasons, opinions, or beliefs were considered factual under
the securities laws, and therefore actionable as material factual
misstatements by the speaker if “(1) the statement [was] not actually
believed, (2) there [was] no reasonable basis for the belief, or (3) the
speaker [was] aware of undisclosed facts tending seriously to undermine the
statements accuracy.”43

39. Reese v. Malone, 747 F.3d 557, 568 (9th Cir. 2014), overruled by Dearborn Heights
Act 345 Police & Fire Ret. Sys. v. Align Tech., Inc., 856 F.3d 605 (9th Cir. 2017).
40. Id. (quoting Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231-32 (1988)).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 579.
43. Id; see also In re Wells Fargo Sec. Litig., 12 F.3d 922, 930 (9th Cir. 1993)
(emphasis added).
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B. Pleading Falsity of Opinion Statements Under Section 11 of the
Securities Act of 1933
The Securities Act of 1933 sought to protect investors by requiring that
issuers disclose information through a registration statement in connection
with a public offering.44 Liability would be imposed on certain individuals
if the registration statement “contained an untrue statement of a material
fact or omitted to state a material fact required to be stated therein or
necessary to make the statements therein not misleading.”45
In its landmark decision in Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers District Council
Construction Industry Pension Fund, the Supreme Court addressed
pleading standards for plaintiffs alleging violation of section 11 of the
Securities Act of 1933 based on material misstatements or omissions
contained in the registration statement filed with the SEC.46 In Omnicare,
the registration statement Omnicare filed with the SEC contained
statements regarding Omnicare’s belief it had complied with legal
requirements, for example: “[w]e believe our contract arrangements . . . are
in compliance with . . . federal and state laws” and “[w]e believe that our
contracts . . . are legally and economically valid . . . .”47 The plaintiffs
purchased shares pursuant to the registration statement, and at a later date
the Federal Government pressed charges against Omnicare alleging the
contracts discussed in the registration statement violated anti-kickback
laws.48 Thereafter, the plaintiffs claimed a violation of section 11 of the
Securities Act of 1933 because the registration statement contained
materially false representations that misled investors.49 The Court
established three standards that apply under different circumstances. First,
liability under Section 11’s false statement clause will follow if the plaintiff
establishes that the speaker did not subjectively believe the statement and
the statement is objectively untrue.50 Second, if alleging an opinion
statement with an embedded fact that is materially misleading, the plaintiff
must demonstrate the fact supporting the opinion is untrue.51 Third, when
alleging a theory of material omission in the registration statement, the
44. Omnicare v. Laborers Dist. Council Const. Ind. Pension Fund, 135 S. Ct. 1318,
1323 (2015); Cohen, supra note 9.
45. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (2012).
46. Omnicare, 135 S. Ct. at 1323-25.
47. Id. at 1323.
48. Id. at 1324.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1327.
51. Id.
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plaintiff must show “facts going to the basis for the issuer’s opinion . . .
whose omission makes the opinion statement at issue misleading to a
reasonable person reading the statement fairly and in context.”52
The Supreme Court formulated these guidelines to guide the section 11
analysis of material misstatements of opinions or beliefs contained in a
registration statement, and focused on the importance of proving falsity.53
By holding it insufficient to simply allege that the belief is wrong and
requiring the plaintiff to allege that the belief was not subjectively held, the
decision prevented investors from “second-guess[ing] inherently subjective
and uncertain assessments” and protected honest opinions.54 Additionally,
when the Court required a plaintiff to allege the falsity of the factual basis
of the opinion to establish liability for an omission, the Court did not
believe its requirement would prevent “valuable information [from]
flowing,” but instead felt that it would enhance the information for
investors.55
IV. Statement of the Case: City of Dearborn Heights Act 345 Police & Fire
Retirement System v. Align Technology, Inc.
A. Facts
This case arose from alleged misstatements in Align Technology’s
communications and filings with the SEC under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934.56 Align Technology Inc. (Align)—a public company subject to
the reporting requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934—
“designs, manufactures, and markets” Invisalign, a system designed to treat
misaligned teeth.57 In March of 2011, Align announced the acquisition of
Cadent; Align intended to integrate Cadent’s design and manufacturing of
3D digital services and other oral scanners used by dentists and
orthodontists into their business.58 Upon acquiring Cadent for $187.6
million, “Align allocated $135.5 million of the purchase price [to its]
‘goodwill’” account.59 $76.9 million of the goodwill was allocated to the

52. Id. at 1332.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1327.
55. Id. at 1332.
56. City of Dearborn Heights Act 345 Police & Fire Ret. Sys. v. Align Tech., Inc., 856
F.3d 605, 609-10 (9th Cir. 2017).
57. Id. at 610.
58. Id.
59. Id.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol71/iss3/7

2019]

NOTES

967

goodwill account for “the acquired computer-aided design and
manufacturing (CAD/CAM) and scanner unit (together with CAD/CAM,
the SCCS unit).”60
Goodwill represents “an intangible asset that [is] ‘the excess of the cost
of an acquired entity over the net of the amounts assigned to assets acquired
and liabilities assumed’”—it represents value of the company that is
difficult to quantify and includes items such as reputation, brand
recognition, and synergy.61 Plaintiff alleged that these goodwill allocation
numbers were based on 2010 inflated revenue numbers due to channel
stuffing activities62 that Cadent participated in prior to the acquisition.63 The
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) require a company to
conduct annual tests for goodwill impairment.64
Plaintiff alleged multiple instances and factors that occurred between the
time of acquisition and the time Align impaired the goodwill; these
allegations included: goodwill overstatement based on inflated numbers,
integration issues with the SCCS unit, struggles in productivity of the
SCCS unit during the acquisition and implementation periods, increases in
competition, change in international sales, and other factors that pointed to
potential issues with goodwill.65 Plaintiff further alleged that there were
seven false and misleading statements concerning Align’s goodwill
valuation of Cadent, and that Align intentionally overvalued goodwill, all of
which injected falsity into statements of the goodwill estimates.66 The
statements all dealt with the analysis of goodwill and indications of
goodwill impairment.67

60. Id.
61. See In re REMEC Inc. Sec. Litig., 702 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1212 (S.D. Cal. 2010)
(citation omitted).
62. Align Tech., Inc., 856 F.3d at 610. “‘Channel stuffing’ means inducing purchasers to
increase substantially their purchases before they would . . . otherwise . . . . It has the result
of shifting earnings into earlier quarters, quite likely to the detriment of earnings in later
quarters.” Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc., 194 F.3d 185, 202 (1st Cir. 1999) (inflating an
earlier quarter’s earnings could have the appearance of higher sales and thus be more
appealing to a potential acquiring corporation).
63. Align Tech., Inc., 856 F.3d at 610.
64. Id. at 611 (defining impairment as occurring “when the carrying amount of goodwill
exceeds” the fair value of the goodwill (quoting FIN’L ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD.,
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS CODIFICATION Topic 350-20-35-28)).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 612-13.
67. Id.
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From the time of acquisition until the third quarter of 2012, Align made
various statements in filings to the SEC and issued various press releases
disavowing any goodwill impairment.68 In October of 2012, however, Align
announced they were conducting impairment tests because of SCCS
performance issues that sparked a 20% decrease in Align’s stock price;
Align eventually noted a goodwill impairment of $52.6 million in
November of 2012.69 Align then made an additional goodwill impairment
charge for $36.6 million in January of 2013, followed by yet another
goodwill impairment charge for the remainder of the goodwill account, so
that the original $76.9 million of goodwill allocated to SCCS totaled $0 in
April of 2013.70 Plaintiff alleged that failure to impair goodwill inserted
falsity into their financial statements—thus leading to materially false and
misleading statements— because of Align’s integration issues and business
struggles.71
B. Issue
The Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s holding that the plaintiff
failed to state a claim and the dismissal of the case pursuant to FRCP
12(b)(6).72 Because the court was reviewing whether the plaintiff failed to
state a claim, it was required to determine the appropriate pleading
standards for section 10(b) and rule 10b-5, particularly for pleading falsity
of opinion statements.73
C. Holding
The court held that although Omnicare addressed section 11 claims
under the Securities Act of 1933, the reasoning in Omnicare applies to
section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 claims.74 When the court applied the Omnicare
standards to the plaintiff’s allegations, it held that the plaintiff pled
insufficient allegations to state a claim for securities fraud because the
plaintiff failed to adequately plead subjective falsity.75

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. at 611-12.
Id.
Id. at 612, 613.
Id. at 612.
Id.
Id. at 612.
Id. at 616.
Id. at 617.
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V. Decision
The court, analyzing the applicability of Omnicare to section 10(b) and
rule 10b-5 claims, compared language in section 11 of the Securities Act
and rule 10b-5, pointing out that both contain “identical limitation of
liability to ‘untrue statement[s]’ and omissions of ‘fact.’”76 The court
reasoned that because of this common language, Omnicare standards of
pleading falsity of opinion statements apply to section 10(b) and rule 10b5.77 Therefore, when pleading falsity of opinion statements, the court
concluded the plaintiff must allege that “‘the speaker did not hold the belief
she professed’ and that the belief is objectively untrue” when relying on a
theory of material misrepresentation.78 When the plaintiff relies on a theory
that the statement contained an embedded fact that is misleading, it must be
alleged that “the supporting fact [the speaker] supplied [is] untrue.”79 And
when the plaintiff relies on omissions theory, then it must be alleged that
“facts going to the basis for the issuer’s opinion . . . whose omission makes
the opinion statement at issue misleading to a reasonable person reading the
statement fairly and in context.”80
The significance of applying Omnicare to section 10(b) and rule 10b-5
claims is that under the prior standard, a plaintiff could rely on pleading
falsity by alleging that “there is no reasonable basis for the belief” under a
material misrepresentation theory.81 But that is irreconcilable with the
Omnicare standard that requires a plaintiff to allege under a material
misrepresentation theory that “‘the speaker did not hold the belief she
possessed’ and that the belief is objectively untrue.”82
This shift in the pleading standard made it more difficult for the plaintiff
to claim material misrepresentations that would survive a 12(b)(6) motion
to dismiss. The plaintiff alleged Align had no reasonable basis for the
goodwill evaluations because they were based on inflated numbers, poor
performance of the SCCS unit, internal struggles in integrating the two
companies, and significant decreases in foreign sales relating to the SCCS

76. Id. at 616 (quoting 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (2018)).
77. Id.
78. Id. (quoting Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers Dist. Council Constr. Indus. Pension Fund,
135 S. Ct. 1318, 1327 (2015)).
79. Id. (quoting Omnicare, Inc., 135 S. Ct. at 1327).
80. Id. (quoting Omnicare, Inc., 135 S. Ct. at 1332).
81. Reese v. Malone, 747 F.3d 557, 579 (9th Cir. 2014), overruled by Dearborn Heights
Act 345 Police & Fire Ret. Sys. v. Align Tech., Inc., 856 F.3d 605 (9th Cir. 2017).
82. Align Tech., Inc., 856 F.3d at 616 (quoting Omnicare, Inc., 135 S. Ct. at 1327).
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unit.83 Even when there may have been a basis to doubt the goodwill
evaluations under all these factors, however, the plaintiff could no longer
rely solely on “no reasonable basis for belief,” but, rather, the only way the
plaintiff could state a claim was to allege that Align did not subjectively
hold the belief and the belief was untrue—all without the opportunity for
any discovery.84 The plaintiff was unable to allege with particularity the
actual assumptions that Align relied upon when Align conducted the
goodwill analysis, meaning it could not show that Align subjectively
believed it misstated the goodwill account.85 Therefore, the court concluded
the plaintiff failed to allege subjective falsity, and thus its claims under a
material misstatement theory of liability regarding the statements of
goodwill were properly dismissed under FRCP 12(b)(6).86
The court also evaluated one of Align’s statements that had an embedded
fact within an opinion statement.87 The statement at issue stated as a fact
that “there were ‘no facts and circumstances’” showing that goodwill was
impaired,88 and, thus, to properly allege the misstatement of the fact, the
plaintiff must allege that “the supporting fact [the speaker] supplies [is]
untrue.”89 The court held that because the plaintiff was unable to allege
additional facts showing Align did not consider negative factors or that the
assumptions Align used in evaluation were untrue or that it did not have a
basis for the evaluation, the plaintiff failed to properly allege falsity of the
statement.90
VI. Analysis
The standard set forth in Omnicare, which was decided by the Supreme
Court in the context of a cause of action under section 11 of the Securities
Act of 1933, should not be applied to a section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 cause
of action in the strict sense that the Ninth Circuit applied it in City of
Dearborn Heights Act 345 Police & Fire Retirement System v. Align
83. See id. at 611.
84. See id. at 617; 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B) (2012) (“[A]ll discovery and other
proceedings shall be stayed during the pendency of any motion to dismiss . . . .”).
85. Align Tech., Inc., 856 F.3d at 618.
86. Id.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(A) (2012).
87. Id. at 613-14 (“Statement 2: (Form 10-K, filed February 29, 2012): ‘[D]uring the
fiscal year ended December 31, 2011, there were no facts and circumstances that indicated
that the fair value of the reporting units may be less than their current carrying amount.’”).
88. Id. at 616 (quoting Omnicare, Inc., 135 S. Ct. at 1327).
89. Id. at 614.
90. Id. at 619.
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Technology, Inc. In determining the applicability of Omnicare to section
10(b) and rule 10b-5, the court overlooked many differences between the
two causes of action, and seemed to consider the standard applicable based
on similar language between the two provisions—they both share a material
misstatement or omission element—while ignoring the many differences
between the claims.91 The court also relied on the Second Circuit’s decision
in Tongue v. Sanofi,92 which determined that Omnicare’s pleading
standards applied to a section 10(b) cause of action because Omnicare
“refined the standard for analyzing whether a statement of opinion is
materially misleading.”93 The Second Circuit in Tongue pointed out that
section 10(b) claims require a showing of scienter whereas claims under
section 11 do not, but did not inquire into whether or not the differences
between the two sections should lead to a determination that Omnicare’s
section 11 analysis should be applied to section 10(b) claims.94 This
concern was expressed by Judge Kleinfeld in City of Dearborn Heights in a
concurring opinion.95 Judge Kleinfeld cautioned that there are material
differences between section 11 and section 10(b), and a further inquiry,
debate, and deliberation over the applicability of Omnicare to section 10(b)
and overturning precedent should have waited until the issue needed to be
determined.96
A. Differences Between Section 11 and Section 10(b)
1. Location of the Misstatement or Omission
Examination of section 11, section 10(b), and rule 10b-5 raises some
concerns regarding the need for different pleading standards for pleading
falsity under the two provisions. Section 11 imposes civil liability “[i]n case
any part of the registration statement . . . contained an untrue statement of a
material fact or omitted to state a material fact required to be stated [in the
registration statement].”97 Section 11 is intended to ensure compliance with
the registration and disclosure provisions by imposing liability on the actors

91. See id. at 616.
92. Id.; Tongue v. Sanofi, 816 F.3d 199 (2d Cir. 2016).
93. Tongue, 816 F.3d at 209.
94. Id.
95. Align Tech., Inc., 856 F.3d at 623-24 (Kleinfeld, J., concurring) (explaining he
would uphold the decision based on the scienter requirement alone, and leave the application
of Omnicare to section 10(b) claims for further debate).
96. Id.
97. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (2012).
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and participants in the registration process.98 Section 10(b) has no such
requirement that the falsity be contained in a certain document or filing.
Instead, a cause of action arises under section 10(b) “by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce . . . [t]o use or employ . . .
any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance.”99 Rule 10b-5
elaborates “by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate
commerce . . . [t]o make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit
to state a material fact.”100 Whereas section 11 was intended to ensure
compliance with the registration requirements, section 10(b) serves as a
“catch-all antifraud provision.”101
Because section 11 claims are limited to the registration statement
instead of the broader section 10(b) claim, the plaintiff will be able to allege
more specifics. The registration statement will be carefully crafted with any
opinion statements contained therein being mulled over by the speaker. A
plaintiff will be able to allege with more details regarding the carefully
crafted registration statement instead of the wide array of statements that
could fall under a section 10b claim that may not have the sufficient
detailed factual background required to allege subjective belief
particularities.
2. Who Can Be Held Liable and By Whom?
Section 11 limits which actors can be held liable for the material
misstatement or omission. Liability is limited to certain enumerated parties
that include: all those who signed the registration statement, directors of the
issuer, experts who certified parts of the registration statement, and every
underwriter of the offering.102 In addition, section 11 expressly exempts
parties that resign from participating in the offering or parties who are not
experts of the particular provisions in question from liability for
misstatements or omissions in the registration statement.103 Section 10(b)
and rule 10b-5 contain no such restrictions on who can be liable, rather,

98. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 381 (1983) (quoting H.R. REP.
NO. 73-85, at 9 (1933)) (“Section 11 creates ‘correspondingly heavier legal liability’ in line
with responsibility to the public.”).
99. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012).
100. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2018).
101. Herman & MacLean, 459 U.S. at 382.
102. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a).
103. Id. § 77k(b).
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“any person” who makes the misstatement can be subject to liability under
these provisions.104
In order to have standing under section 11, “the pool . . . has been
defined narrowly.”105 Because of the nature of the claim in alleging
misstatement in the registration statement, the scope is limited to persons
who purchased in the offering or shares that are traceable to the offering
pursuant to the registration statement that contained the alleged
misstatement.106 However, section 10(b) is a relatively broad “catch-all”
antifraud provision that contains a broader scope of potential plaintiffs with
standing to bring suit and is limited to persons who have purchased or sold
the security in connection with the fraud.107
3. Plaintiff’s Burden
Section 11 provides a limited scope for liability in terms of what the
misstatement must be, who can be liable, and how much liability may be
imposed, whereas section 10(b) is much broader. Thus, while “[section] 11
places a relatively minimal burden on a plaintiff,” section 10(b) claims
place a higher burden on plaintiffs to restrict 10(b)’s applicability.108
For section 11, the plaintiff carries a lighter burden to allege it purchased
“a security issued under a materially false registration statement.”109 The
plaintiff must simply prove the registration statement contained a materially
false statement or omission and that it purchased securities under such
registration statement.110 While a plaintiff need not purchase directly in the
offering, one of the most challenging obstacles in a section 11 cause of
action is tracing the shares back to the registration statement when the
shares are purchased in the secondary market.111 Unless the registration
statement contains indicia of fraud, then there are no additional pleading
requirements that must be met under section 11; therefore FRCP rule
8(a)(2) general pleading standards will apply, meaning section 11 itself

104. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j; 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
105. Todd R. David, Heightened Pleading Requirements, Due Diligence, Reliance, Loss
Causation, and Truth-on-the-Market-Available Defenses to Claims Under Sections 11 and
12 of the Securities Act of 1933, 11 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 53, 60 (2010).
106. Id.
107. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j; Herman & MacLean, 459 U.S. at 382.
108. Herman & MacLean, 459 U.S. at 382.
109. See In re Century Aluminum Co. Sec. Litig., 729 F.3d 1104, 1106 (9th Cir. 2013).
110. See id.
111. See id.
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generally does not impose heightened pleading standards.112 The imposition
of the Omnicare standards adds an additional burden, but pleading a section
11 cause of action still faces fewer hurdles when compared to a section
10(b) cause of action. In Omnicare, the Supreme Court recognized the
burden that would be placed on plaintiffs by stating that it will be “no small
task for an investor” to meet the standard.113 This shows that, even in a
section 11 cause of action, Omnicare is considered to impose a stringent
requirement.114
Section 11 requirements stand in stark contrast to the requirements for a
cause of action under section 10(b). The section 10(b) requirements include
“(1) a material misrepresentation or omission; (2) scienter; (3) a connection
between the misrepresentation or omission and the purchase or sale of a
security; (4) reliance; (5) economic loss; and (6) loss causation.”115 In
addition, because plaintiffs are alleging fraud they must meet the
requirements to state with particularity their claims alleging fraud under
FRCP 9(b) and the PSLRA.116 The most significant requirement that often
poses the most difficulty for plaintiffs is the requirement to plead particular
facts leading to prove scienter,117 whereas the most difficult task under
section 11 is tracing the shares being sold pursuant to the registration
statement in question.118 Additionally, while the requirements at the
pleading stage are heightened under FRCP 9(b) and PSLRA, a plaintiff’s
complaint must still fall in line with FRCP 8(a)(2) and avoid what has been
termed “puzzle pleading.” “Puzzle pleading” has been held to violate FRCP
8(a), and is present where the complaint contains, for example, large lists of
challenged statements followed by various reasons why they are misleading
without specifically allocating reasons to each statement.119 To reach the
level of “puzzle pleading” the complaint has to be fairly extreme and a
complaint will not easily rise to that level; however, puzzle pleading
112. See City of Dearborn Heights Act 345 Police & Fire Ret. Sys. v. Align Tech., Inc.,
856 F.3d 605, 624 (9th Cir. 2017) (Kleinfeld, J., concurring); see also David, supra note
105, at 60.
113. Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers Dist. Council Constr., 135 S. Ct. 1318, 1332 (2015).
114. See id.
115. Or. Pub. Emps. Ret. Fund v. Apollo Grp. Inc., 774 F.3d 598, 603 (9th Cir. 2014)
(citing Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific–Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 157 (2008)).
116. See supra notes 22–28 and accompanying text.
117. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 382 (1983).
118. See In re Century Aluminum Co. Sec. Litig., 729 F.3d 1104, 1106 (9th Cir. 2013).
119. See, e.g., W. Pa. Elec. Emps. Pension Fund v. Mentor Graphics Corp., No. 316-CV470-PK, 2017 WL 3668957, at *18-19 (D. Or. 2017); In re Splash Tech. Holdings, Inc. Sec.
Litig., 160 F. Supp. 2d 1059, 1073 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
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presents another balance for plaintiffs’ complaints—to plead with enough
particularity to satisfy PSLRA and FRCP 9(b) while avoiding “puzzle
pleading.”
B. Implications of Applying Omnicare Standards to Section 10(b) Falsity
of Opinion Statements
Because of the broad applicability of section 10(b), a broad range of
possible parties could have standing to sue and liability can reach “any
person.” So it follows that there needs to be additional pleading
requirements to narrow the cause of action, especially because of the
seriousness of the allegations of fraud. But under City of Dearborn Heights,
the task of pleading a cause of action for falsity of opinion statement for
material misrepresentation under section 10(b) could be approaching a
point where the cumulative effect of the requirements run contrary to the
foundational purpose of the securities laws to protect investors, ensure
accurate disclosure, and preserve the integrity of the markets.120 In addition
to alleging specific facts necessary to establish scienter, plaintiffs must also
state with particularity that the assumptions relied on for the misstatement
were not actually held by the speaker—all at the pleading stage.121 In
Omnicare, the Court recognized that it would be “no small task for an
investor” to identify particular facts going to the basis for and subjective
belief of the opinion statement.122 While the Court recognized they were
making it no small task for investors, this was in relation to a section 11
claim—which has much lighter pleading requirements and a more narrowly
tailored cause of action to start with.123 Conversely, even before the
Omnicare standards were applied to section 10(b) pleading, it was already
no small task for the investor to make it through the pleading stages
because of the multiple elements to allege a 10(b) claim and the already
heightened pleading standard.
The Ninth Circuit agreed with the Second Circuit in the justification for
applying the Omnicare standards because it determined that Omnicare
simply “refined the standard for analyzing whether a statement of opinion is
120. See Superintendent of Ins. of N.Y. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12
(1971); 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2012) (“for the protection of investors”); see also Thel, supra note
1, at 425.
121. See City of Dearborn Heights Act 345 Police & Fire Ret. Sys., v. Align Tech., Inc.,
856 F.3d 605, 612 (9th Cir. 2017).
122. Omnicare, Inc., v. Laborers Dist. Council Constr. Indus. Pension Fund, 135 S. Ct.
1338, 1332 (2015).
123. See id.
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materially misleading”; and sound statutory interpretation demands that
section 11 impose the same requirements in the section 10(b) context.124
However, there are reasons that terms or phrases, particularly within
securities laws, should be interpreted differently—interpretations should
fall in line with congressional intent.
VI. Conclusion
Courts need to undertake a more thorough analysis in their application of
Omnicare standards to falsity of opinion statements under section 10(b). In
City of Dearborn Heights, the Ninth Circuit applied the Omnicare standards
to a case where, as pointed out in the concurrence, it was not needed. The
court rushed through the analysis of applying Omnicare, did not consider
the cumulative effect of such a move, and failed to analyze how the
differences in a section 11 claim and section 10(b) claim might give rise to
the need for different pleading standards. The type of misstatement, the
context, the parties involved, and the existing pleading requirements are
inherently different in the two claims, and thus necessitate different
pleading requirements. Since a registration statement is narrowly tailored
and a plaintiff has a low burden to allege a section 11 claim, the opinion
statements in a registration statement deserve some level of added
protection. After all, they are opinion statements, and liability should not
flow simply because of an incorrect opinion.125 However, in alleging a
section 10(b) claim, there are already multiple levels of protection in place
for opinion statements through the heightened pleading requirements and
the multiplicity of elements that have to be alleged in comparison to section
11.126 A thorough consideration and analysis of the differences and total
effects is needed to ensure that the correct balance is struck between
preventing meritless claims from proceeding to the discovery stage and
allowing claims that have merit to continue. In striking this balance, the
application of Omnicare to section 10(b) claims makes it even more
difficult for a plaintiff claiming a falsity of opinion statement to survive a
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss because they now have to allege that the speaker
did not subjectively believe the opinion statement. Further, the plaintiff
must do so with particularity, while satisfying FRCP 9(b) and PSLRA,
along with the other five elements of a section 10(b) claim—all without any
124. Allign Tech., Inc., 856 F.3d at 616 (quoting Tongue v. Sanofi, 816 F.3d 199, 209 (2d
Cir. 2016)).
125. See Omnicare, Inc., 135 S. Ct. at 1327.
126. See supra Section V.A.
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discovery. It can be argued that City of Dearborn Heights is in line with
congressional intent under the PSLRA to curtail fraud claims without merit.
And while that may be the case, the question needs to be raised, considered,
and addressed: at what point does allowing defendants to have a case
dismissed without much inquiry into the actual facts stray too far from
protecting investors and ensuring market integrity by limiting fraud and
manipulation? Because discovery is stayed and the defendant’s toolbox is
full of defenses during the motion to dismiss, they have a strong likelihood
of having the case dismissed for a plaintiff’s failure to successfully
maneuver the minefield of alleging a section 10(b) violation even when
illegal actions have taken place.
Thanks to City of Dearborn Heights, defendants now have another tool
in their toolbox at the pleading stage when facing a section 10(b) claim,
resulting in the increased likelihood of meritorious claims being dismissed
on a 12(b)(6) motion. This development cuts against the foundational
purpose of the Securities Act of 1933 and Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
While the tremendous damage that can arise from fraud claims may be
justification for the heightened pleading requirements, there remains a
certain level of protection that must be preserved to safeguard investors.
This issue calls for more thorough analysis by courts before a blind
application of Omnicare to claims outside of section 11 context. The
balance between investor protection and protection of the parties making
the statements must be preserved.
J. Cooper Davis
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